By Roos Haer
This e-book examines no matter if changes within the organizational constitution of armed teams form styles of human rights violations in civil wars.
Since the top of worldwide warfare II, civil wars were characterised by means of super excessive numbers of civilian casualties. even though, the precise volume of civilian ache varies throughout time, clash, and geographic zone. lately, a brand new strand of study has emerged, essentially excited about learning the dynamics underlying the adaptation in civilian abuse by way of analyzing the features of the armed teams and the way those features impression the armed teams’ behaviour in the direction of the civilian inhabitants.
With connection with principal-agent idea and information at the organizational constitution of greater than 70 armed teams energetic all over the world from 1989 onwards, the author’s research features either at the point of the armed staff and at the point of the person through own interviews with fighters.
Offering a distinct perception into how components corresponding to recruitment equipment, hierarchy and organizational dedication may perhaps impact the chance of civilian abuse via fighters, this e-book should be of a lot curiosity to scholars of political violence, civil wars, struggle and clash reviews, safeguard stories and IR in general.
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Additional resources for Armed Group Structure and Violence in Civil Wars: The Organizational Dynamics of Civilian Killing
At the same time, the successful outcome of a revolt by the armed group is a low-probability event (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). Why, therefore, should agents pay a cost rather than free ride? Such a “free rider” tendency can jeopardize the supply of collective goods and people are likely to obtain a less preferred outcome than if they all behave irrationally and participate (Muller and Opp 1986; Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1970: 105). The problem of adverse selection 27 Second, expected utility models maintain that the probability of one combatant making a difference to the outcome of a rebellion is quite small.
In the next two chapters, these two problems are explained in more detail. More importantly, potential strategies are discussed that help the principal to overcome these two problems and increase her control over her troops. In turn, I argue in the upcoming chapters that this increase of control has severe consequences for the civilian population in conflict-ridden countries. Note 1 In order to make things clear throughout the different chapters, I decided to define principals as female and agents as males.
Deborah Avant (1993; 1994) was one of the first that borrowed insights from the principal–agent theory to explain different propensities for innovation across British and American military organizations. Risa Brooks (2000) also uses the theory to compare how different patterns of civil-military relations produce different grand military strategies. Amy Zegart (1999) uses it to explore the design of national security agencies at the start of the Cold War. However, applications of the principal–agent theory to the study of armed groups and their behavior towards the civilian population almost do not exist (Johnson 2008).