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Extra resources for Arms Control in Space: Exploring Conditions for Preventive Arms Control
Both tactics can have negative effects on the trust and goodwill of the negotiating parties and can lead to an arms build-up rather than to arms control if not handled carefully. Closely related to the pursuit of parity is the problem of technological momentum and supposed cost-benefit analysis. As Sheehan (1988: 41–2) correctly observes: The question of whether or not technology drives the arms race is crucial to any assessment of the limitations and possibilities of the arms control process. If the arms race is a function of inevitable advances in military technology then the attempt to control it through political agreements may be foredoomed to failure.
The proponents attempt to show that arms control in space, if established, would mitigate the security dilemma and greatly improve space security. The opponents, in contrast, portray arms control in space as a dangerous compromise of one’s security. The question, under which conditions Arms Control: Concepts and Debates 37 states might agree on arms control in space – arms control in space as dependent variable – remains largely unanswered. That does not mean that this question is not touched upon by some of the works on space security.
Domestic politics are mentioned by most studies. Domestic groups that try to influence national decision-makers against arms control can be divided into two groups (Müller 1996: 402–3). There are those who oppose arms control because they believe that it compromises national security. Usually they argue that unconstrained armament is the best strategy to optimize security. A second group opposes arms control because of vested economic interests in certain armament projects – although this Arms Control: Concepts and Debates 25 second group often makes use of the arguments of the first one.