Download Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War by Robert A. Pape PDF

By Robert A. Pape

From Iraq to Bosnia to North Korea, the 1st query in American international coverage debates is more and more: Can air strength by myself do the task? Robert A. Pape presents a scientific resolution. examining the result of over thirty air campaigns, together with an in depth reconstruction of the Gulf battle, he argues that the main to luck is attacking the enemy's army procedure, now not its economic system, humans, or leaders. Coercive air strength can be triumphant, yet no longer as affordably as air lovers want to believe.

Pape examines the air raids on Germany, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq in addition to these of Israel as opposed to Egypt, delivering information of bombing and governmental choice making. His specific narratives of the strategic effectiveness of bombing diversity from the classical instances of global struggle II to a rare reconstruction of airpower use within the Gulf struggle, in line with lately declassified records. during this now-classic paintings of the speculation and perform of airpower and its political results, Robert A. Pape is helping army strategists and coverage makers pass judgement on the aim of assorted air ideas, and is helping common readers comprehend the coverage debates.

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683-85. 38 Aaron Wildavsky; "The Self-Evaluating Organization," Public Administration Review 32 (September-October 1972): 509-20. Van Evera, "Causes of War," pp. 453-99. On obstacles to military innovation, see Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). 39 Edward Shils, The Torment of Secrecy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956). 4o Additional reasons why coercion tends to come late include unwillingness to abandon sunk costs and states' interests in protecting their reputations for future conflicts.

Both battlefield operations and logistics are coordinated by centralized headquarters in the rear; if communication is disrupted, frontline forces become sluggish and vulnerable to defeat in 29 B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (New York: Putnam's, 1970), pp. 159-70,37C>-96. 30 Andrew T. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 3-10. Representative of the extensive literature on guerrilla warfare are David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1964); Robert G.

Punishment strategies do not, however, usually offer significant coercive leverage, for six reasons. First, the territorial stakes in coercive disputes are often very important for either national security or nationalist reasons. As a result, states involved in coercive disputes are often willing to accept high costs, including civilian suffering, to achieve their objectives. Punishment can succeed when the target state has only minor interests at stake in the dispute, but these successes are likely to be rare because the coercer is li~ely also to have only low interests at stake and so is easily deterred from issuing a coercive threat.

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