By John V. Parachini, David E. Mosher, John C. Baker, Keith Crane, Michael S. Chase, Michael Daugherty
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Additional info for Diversion of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Expertise from the Former Soviet Union: Understanding an Evolving Problem
Attempts to clandestinely acquire expertise from FSU scientists should be considered in the context of other pathways that states and terrorist groups might use to enhance their capabilities. Official, state-sanctioned, or bilateral contacts. These pathways may include any contact, program, or event under the auspices of the state. 30 Bilateral scientific exchanges also provide ideal conditions for transferal of sensitive information, whereby officially exchanged information on nuclear processes, ostensibly for peaceful use, may be used for weapons purposes.
Secondary proliferation seems to have been more extensive than diversion from the FSU countries. To some extent, this secondary proliferation may reduce the demand for weapons-critical knowledge from the FSU. S. programs contributed to incentive structure Knowledge diversion from several types of personnel, not just weapons experts, poses a proliferation risk Diversions from state-sanctioned activities and secondary proliferants may provide significant opportunities for proliferation NBC facilities facing transition (closure, downsizing, and financial distress) pose the biggest proliferation risk 5.
Facilities that have bleak prospects for sustaining weapons experts and their families, such as facilities in nuclear cities that are slated for closure, potentially present greater incentives for personnel to engage in illicit knowledge transfer as a means of reducing their current or expected future financial distress. 24 Evidence of Demand for FSU Knowledge and Materials Nuclear cases • • • • • China Iran and Minatom India Aum Al Qaeda Biological cases • Iran and Vector Chemical cases • Syria and Gen.