By Patrick W. Quirk
This booklet bargains an unique and theoretically wealthy exam into the dynamics of alliances that fab powers and susceptible states shape to defeat threats, akin to uprising or insurgency, in the smaller state’s borders. the writer examines modern examples of such “internal possibility alliances,” together with Russia’s collaboration with Syria’s Assad regime to defeat anti-government rebels and U.S. cooperation with Afghanistan’s ruling political elite to wrestle the Taliban. In every one case, the weaker state’s management desired to stay in strength whereas the good energy sought to defend its pursuits associated with the regime’s balance. The e-book provides to diplomacy (IR) idea through offering a unique conceptual framework that explains why inner hazard alliances shape, why a few are extra cohesive than others, and why a few are powerful whereas others aren't. It therefore grants to be of curiosity to IR students and scholars operating within the parts of protection reviews, alliance dynamics, political violence, and civil struggle, but in addition to policy-makers grappling with easy methods to salvage pursuits, similar to entry to traditional assets or local balance, imperiled by way of violence in vulnerable states.
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Additional info for Great Powers, Weak States, and Insurgency: Explaining Internal Threat Alliances
In other words, capabilities are the recipe for a highly effective traditional alliance. With internal threat alliances, this assumption does not necessarily hold. In the cases of Colombia, Afghanistan, and Syria, we see that the regime’s actors may—or may not—apply alliances resources against the target threat. As a result, to be effective an internal threat alliance must couple sufficient military resources as well as a host government taking action to prevent collusion with the enemy. To address this issue, great power policy-makers would be well served to devote more attention to using diplomacy and associated incentives to push actors to balance (or to prevent collusion) in addition to making sure that the alliance has sufficient resources to guarantee military victory.
The first data factor provides a measure of the size of the opposition (threat) vis-à-vis the peripheral regime, while the second provides an indication of the opposition’s ability to organize and leverage their personnel to obtain territory. This second factor is also a useful measure to track changes in strength of the threat opposition strength throughout the intervention and identify relationships between these factors. For example, should amount of opposition-held territory decrease following formation of the alliance and continue to decline, this may be an indication of alliance effectiveness.
Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 17. 17. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 17. 18. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (1987), 21. 19. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (1987), x and 21–26. See also Stephen M. Walt, “Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southeast Asia,” International Organization 42, No. 2 (1988), 277. Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back in,” International Security 19, No.