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Additional info for The politics of positive incentives in arms control
Whereas in exchange and extortion actor B is seeking positive incentives by constructing a linkage, in situations of explanation B is simply explaining to A an existing connection between issues which to ignore, or even to remove, would be beyond B's meansunless help is provided by A. Each form of contingent actionexchange, extortion, and explanationis associated with peculiar problems of information, perception, credibility, welfare-implications and different degrees of effectiveness. In principle, the preference structure in a particular interaction involving positive or negative incentives can match the preference structure characteristic of any of the three mentioned forms of contingent action.
As a starting point, we assume that asymmetries between countries in terms of their preferences for certain arms control measures and in terms of their technical, administrative, or financial capacity for implementing such measures are important impediments to substantive arms control steps. These difficulties are distinct from the monitoring (verification) and enforcement problems that are usually posited in the arms control literature as the principal obstacles to cooperation (Sandler 1994; Kay 1994; Morrow 1994).
The more adversarial a relationship is, the more a country will be concerned about relative benefits and costs of an agreement. , when the survival of a state may be at stake, the problem of relative gains is bound to be particularly serious (Baldwin 1993; Krasner 1991). However, for reasons of simplicity, it is assumed for the time being that in order to secure agreement among countries with asymmetric preferences or capacity, the net benefit (benefits minus costs) of any given country in a group must be positive.